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Foothill Communities Coalition v County of Orange (2014) 222 CA4th 1302
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Existing residents of upscale areas w ho hope to keep their surroundings free of new  developments that they fear
may degrade their attractiveness are likely to f ind their ability to do so reduced by this decision.
In this case, a church proposed to construct a senior housing project on seven acres of land that had been donated to it. Since such a
project did not qualify for any kind of “as of right” approval under the applicable general or specif ic plans—w hich had been w ritten back in
1982, w hen no one w as thinking about elder housing—those plans had to be amended to justify creation of a new  zoning classif ication for
that kind of housing, and the zoning ordinance and map had to be amended to designate the church’s land w ith the new  label. Local
government off icials w ere w illing to take all these steps, but the neighbors w ere not.
The resisting neighbors had many persuasive-sounding challenges. Amending a general plan is alw ays a more suspect activity than its
original enactment, and judicial review  inevitably takes into account—even if only implicitly—apprehension as to w hether the change w as
truly dictated by bona f ide considerations (such as discovering an original mistake or seeing a recent change of circumstances) rather than
a desire to do a favor for a friendly supporter. The change becomes even more suspicious w hen its purpose is not to make an across-the-
board amendment but is instead designed to enable the reclassif ication of a single piece of land. Planning and zoning are supposed to treat
all properties in a district uniformly, w hich is the exact opposite of w hat happens w hen a single parcel is rezoned and everything else is left
the w ay it w as. (In other states, those considerations often lead courts to treat the rezoning as an adjudicative rather than a legislative act,
even though done by elected off icials; in California, how ever, it is called “quasi-legislative,” w hich gives it the benefit of subjecting it to
review  by ordinary mandamus, w ith its loose “arbitrary and capricious” standard, rather than by administrative mandate and the more
stringent “substantial evidence” test.)
Project opponents often succeed w hen they can persuade judges to label the government’s action as “spot zoning”—w hat this court calls
“irrational discrimination”—making the rezoning sound ipso facto bad. Whether up spot zoning or dow n spot zoning, treating one parcel of
land differently from all others just does not seem compatible w ith the concept of a “general” plan or w ith our constitutional requirement of
equal protection. What makes this decision notew orthy is the court’s determining that this w as spot zoning w ithout thereupon leaping to the
conclusion that it w as therefore automatically bad. Once the spot zoning label w as not allow ed to itself decide the case (as apparently it did
at trial), it w as easy for the court to go on to decide that the changes w ere not arbitrary or capricious, even though only one spot w as
involved.
When zoning law s f irst got started, w orries about constitutional legitimacy w ere serious enough as to make the early enabling acts and
zoning ordinances apply as uniformly w ithin districts as possible. But that w as 90 years ago; the w ay land use regulation is managed
now adays makes it look much more like horse trading than policy-driven legislating, but w e have all gotten quite used to it.—Roger Bernhardt
 
